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I. INTRODUCTION
A taxpayer is entitled to a charitable contribution deduction for
gifts of money or property made during the taxable year to nonprofit
organizations.' A taxpayer is not entitled to a deduction for the con-
tribution of services. 2 There are a wide variety of organizations to
which a taxpayer can donate money or property and receive a charita-
ble contribution deduction.3 These organizations are thought to en-
hance the betterment of society and are therefore generally relieved of
tax obligations,4 and contributions to the tax-exempt organizations
are deductible under § 170 of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code").
Section 170 has gone through countless statutory revisions since
its enactment in 1917. As originally enacted, the provision was de-
signed to allow "wealthy" taxpayers to receive a deduction for charita-
ble giving.5 Although the basic premise remains the same, the
current statutory scheme has been transformed from a short statutory
provision into a complex set of rules. Many commentators have writ-
ten about the complexity of the Code, in general, and have outlined
proposals for simplification. 6 Scholarship has also addressed methods
1. I.R.C. § 170(a) (2002).
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(g) (2002). The out-of-pocket expenses associated with the
provision of services are, however, deductible. Id.
3. For example, during taxable year 1997, Microsoft's Bill and Melinda Gates's
charitable contributions included $200 million to establish the Gates Library
Foundation, $20 million to Cambridge University, $10 million to Lakeside School,
$2.3 million to Johns Hopkins University, $1.8 million to Access to Voluntary and
Safe Contraception, $1.1 million to Friends of Mandela Children's Fund, and $1
million to the Catholic Archdiocese of Seattle. GIVING USA 1998: THE ANNUAL
REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 1997, at 138 (Ann E. Kaplan ed., 1998)
[hereinafter GIVING USA 1998].
4. See I.R.C. § 501 (2002) (setting forth exemption from taxation for certain
organizations).
5. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Daniel J. Mitchell, Perspective: The Inevitability of the Flat Tax, 48 EM-
ORY L.J. 829 (1999) (asserting the inevitability of the flat tax, considering the
complexity and inequality created under the current tax code); Sidney I. Roberts
et al., A Report on Complexity and the Income Tax, 27 TAx L. REV. 325, 334 (1972)
(stating, "[blecause the present situation has grown to such an alarming point of
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of simplifying the charitable contribution provisions. 7 This Article
will address the complexity inherent in the charitable contribution
provisions and explain why such complexity is essential to maintain
an equitable statutory scheme that encourages charitable giving but
prevents tax abuse.
While the statutory complexity is essential, there are other
problems with the statutory scheme of charitable giving. One of these
problems is the strain between the charitable contribution rules and
the progressive tax system. The charitable contribution rules affront
the progressive tax system because of the inability of nonitemizers to
claim a charitable contribution deductions and because of the impact
of the so-called "upside down" subsidy. The present law precludes
many taxpayers from availing themselves of the deduction and allows
other taxpayers to claim the deduction while maintaining and solidi-
fying their position and power in the community. 9 The effectiveness of
the charitable contribution deduction is also limited by Congress's en-
actment of legislation that gradually eliminates the estate tax.10
Under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001, the estate tax will be completely phased out for taxpayers dying
after 2009.11 Under the present estate taxation provisions, a donor is
entitled to claim an unlimited charitable contribution deduction for
crisis, a commission should be established, consisting of informed experts in all
participating groups, which will seek to reverse the trend toward complexity");
Richard P. Davies, Note, A Flat Tax Without Bumpy Philanthropy: Decreasing
the Impact of a 'Low, Single Rate' on Individual Charitable Contributions, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1749, 1797 (1997) (arguing that Congress should enact an "impure
flat tax plan" that furthers the goal of simplification but retains the charitable
contribution deduction).
7. See, e.g., C. Eugene Steuerle & Martin A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple and
Effective Giving: Reforming the Tax Rules for Charitable Contributions and
Charitable Organizations, 12 AMER. J. TAx POL'Y 399 (1995).
8. IRS statistics clearly show that a greater percentage of lower-income taxpayers
claim the standard deduction rather than itemized deductions. For taxable year
1998, of the 85.6 million taxpayers who claimed the standard deduction, more
than one-half of them had adjusted gross incomes of under $20,000. Internal
Revenue Serv., STAT. INCOME BULL., Fall 2000, at 33.
9. Alice Gresham Bullock, Taxes, Social Policy and Philanthropy: The Untapped
Potential of Middle- and Low-Income Generosity, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
325, 330-31, 342 (1997). Professor Bullock derives this position from the so-called
"upside-down" effect or subsidy, denial of a deduction to nonitemizers, and crea-
tion of foundations by wealthy taxpayers. But cf. Matthew F. Jones, Comment,
The Other Family Tree: Leaving Your Legacy in a Private Foundation, 63 ALB. L.
REV. 567 (1999) (stating that one of the advantages to establishing private foun-
dations is the donor's ability to maintain the contributed assets).
10. The reduction of income tax rates also impacts charitable giving. See Davies,
supra note 6, at 1750.
11. See 2001 TAx LEGISLATION: LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS: ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND TAX RELIEF RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2001, [ 305, at 99 (CCH, 2001) [hereinaf-
ter 2001 TAx LEGISLATION].
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bequests to a qualified charitable organization.12 In 1997, decedents
claimed $14.3 billion in charitable contribution deductions on their es-
tate tax returns.13 Empirical data show that a charitable contribution
subsidy generally increases charitable contributions.14 The eventual
repeal of the estate tax will obliterate the tax incentive for a decedent
to make charitable bequests.15
There are, however, occasions when individuals will be overly phil-
anthropic irrespective of the tax incentive. In recent days, there has
been a concentrated effort to raise charitable funds to address the
myriad of problems facing victims of the horrific September 11, 2001
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and on the Pentagon
in Virginia, as well as victims of the tragic plane crash in Penn-
sylvania. At least $500 million in charitable donations has been
pledged to the victims. 16 After the tragedies of September 11, people
even used the Internet to make charitable donations.17 This charita-
ble giving resulted from the tragic attacks rather than from a desire to
lower one's tax liability. Other than a national tragedy such as the
September 11 attacks, it is doubtful that people would be willing to
donate at this high of a level. Consequently, a charitable contribution
tax incentive has continued vitality insofar as it encourages people to
make charitable donations throughout the year.
An argument can be raised that the charitable contribution deduc-
tion is an ineffective means of subsidizing charitable organizations. In
addition, the complexity and inequity of the current charitable contri-
bution provisions raise inefficiency concerns. In light of these
problems, one might opine that the charitable contribution deduction
should be repealed altogether and that the government should instead
subsidize charitable organizations through direct expenditures. The
use of direct expenditures would simplify the Code and would have the
added advantage of efficiency. However, constitutional constraints
work against using public funds to directly support religious-based
charitable organizations, and almost one-half of charitable contribu-
tions are made to such organizations. ' 8 It is not impermissible for the
government to subsidize religious-based and other nonprofit organiza-
12. I.R.C. § 2055(a) (2002).
13. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
14. Todd Izzo, Comment, A Full Spectrum of Light: Rethinking the Charitable Contri-
bution Deduction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2371, 2372-73 (1993).
15. Although it is unclear whether the estate tax repeal will be permanent, it is likely
that it will be, or, if it is not, it is likely that the tax will be limited to large
estates. See infra notes 206, 214-16 and accompanying text.
16. David Barstow, A Nation Challenged: The Donations; Spitzer Plans to Coordi-
nate Charity Efforts for Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2001, at B10.
17. Janet Kornblum, Donations Soar Immediately on Net, USA TODAY, Sept. 18,
2001, at 12C. For example, Amazon reported that its cite had received $150,000
per hour while the donation ceiling was $100 per donation. Id.
18. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
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tions indirectly through tax deductions. As such, the most effective
system of governmental subsidization of charitable organizations in-
volves the use of direct expenditures that do not implicate constitu-
tional constraints in conjunction with the charitable contribution
deduction tax incentive.
Part II of this Article explores the history of § 170 from its initial
enactment in 1917 through the numerous amendments since made. 19
This Part does not outline every amendment that Congress has en-
acted but provides sufficient detail to illustrate how the section has
gone from a fairly simple provision to an extremely complex set of
rules. Part III of this Article addresses various equity considerations.
The first issue examined is whether charities have societal value that
should be encouraged or subsidized under the Code. Alternatively,
this Article considers the use of direct expenditures as the primary
means of the government's subsidization of charitable organizations
and discusses the constitutional roadblocks to direct expenditures.
Part III also addresses whether the complex rules that exist today are
necessary to achieve the statutory objectives. 20 Part III also ad-
dresses how the charitable contribution deduction fails to further the
needs of the poor and whether the provisions should be amended to
provide an additional incentive for taxpayers to make contributions to
organizations that are designed to combat poverty. Finally, this Part
addresses how the charitable contribution rules impact the progres-
sive tax structure and how the current scheme is inconsistent with
progressive taxation.
Part IV of this Article considers perspectives on the future of chari-
table giving. This Part analyzes the impact of the elimination of the
estate tax and addresses whether Congress should enhance the incen-
tives for charitable giving in light of the phaseout of the estate tax.
This might be necessary if the repeal of the estate tax is made perma-
nent. Finally, this Part addresses whether Congress must make some
statutory adjustments to the charitable contribution rules to protect
the integrity of the progressive tax structure.
19. This Article focuses primarily on charitable giving as it relates to individual do-
nors. For an in-depth discussion and analysis of corporate giving, see Nancy J.
Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, The Nature of the
Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1994).
20. It is beyond the scope of this Article to critically analyze all the fundamentals of
charitable giving. This Article also does not provide guidance for the careful
planning that is required in order to maximize the objectives of the charitable
organization and of the donor. For a detailed discussion of these matters, see
JAMES W. COLLITON, CHARITABLE GIFTS (3d ed. 1999), and BRUCE R. HOPKINS,
THE TAX LAW OF CHARITABLE GIVING (1993).
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II. THE HISTORY OF § 170 AND ITS
INCREASED COMPLEXITY
A. The Early Years: 1917-1924
To encourage private philanthropy, Congress included a charitable
contribution deduction in the Code. The original charitable deduction
was provided in the War Income Tax Revenue Act of 1917. The statu-
tory language provided:
Contributions or gifts actually made within the year to corporations or as-
sociations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scien-
tific, or educational purposes, or to societies for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of
any private stockholder or individual, to an amount not in excess of fifteen per
centum of the taxpayer's taxable net income as computed without the benefit
of this paragraph. Such contributions or gifts shall be allowable as deductions
only if verified under rules and regulations prescribed by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury.
2 1
Congress has made substantial changes to the charitable contribution
rules since the original enactment in 1917. Some of the amendments
were inconsequential while others represented material changes to
the statutory provision.
For instance, within a relatively short period of time, Congress pro-
posed changes to the 15% ceiling. Although not enacted, in the Reve-
nue Act of 1924, the Senate Finance Committee proposed the
elimination of the 15% ceiling where a taxpayer had contributed more
than 90% of the taxpayer's net income during the current taxable year
and the preceding ten taxable years. 22 If Congress had repealed the
percentage limitation, a taxpayer theoretically could have manipu-
lated the taxpayer's tax liability by eliminating all taxable income
through charitable giving. However, the Senate Finance Committee
perceived less tax abuse where a taxpayer consistently contributed
large percentages of the taxpayer's taxable income over a long period
of time.23
B. Tax Period 1938-1958
The Revenue Act of 1938 made some modest, though significant,
modifications to the charitable contribution deduction rules. One sig-
nificant change was that Congress permitted the charitable contribu-
tion deduction only if the taxpayer actually made the payment during
21. War Income Tax Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), reprinted in J.S. SEID-
MAN, SEIDMAN's LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAx LAws, 1938-1861,
at 944 (1938).
22. SEIDMAN, supra note 21, at 733.
23. The legislative history for this proposal provides, "This provision is designed sub-
stantially to free from income taxation one who is habitually contributing to be-
nevolent organizations amounts equaling virtually his entire income." Id. at 734.
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the taxable year, irrespective of the taxpayer's method of account-
ing.2 4 According to the committee reports, the intent of the amend-
ment was to clarify uncertainty and provide uniformity as to whether
a taxpayer would be entitled to a charitable contribution deduction
upon a pledge of a contribution, notwithstanding that the payment
would not necessarily be made until the following taxable year.2 5
Prior to the amendment, the statute was silent as to when a taxpayer
was entitled to claim the deduction where the taxpayer made the char-
itable pledge during the taxable year but did not make the payment
until a later taxable year.26
Also, Congress eventually made changes to the 15% ceiling. Under
the Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, Congress retained the 15%
ceiling but changed its measurement from "net taxable income" to "ad-
justed gross income."2 7 Net taxable income was defined as gross in-
come less allowable deductions except charitable contributions.28 Net
taxable income was not limited to ordinary net income but also in-
cluded net capital gains.2 9 The effect of this change was to increase
the allowable deduction. The adjusted gross income could exceed net
taxable income because taxable income was computed after factoring
in allowable deductions. For example, if a taxpayer had an adjusted
gross income of $25,000, the maximum deduction would be $3,750. Al-
ternatively, where the deduction is based on taxable income, and the
taxpayer had paid $2,000 in taxes during the year, the maximum
charitable contribution deduction would be $3,450. In 1952, Congress
made another substantive change to the ceiling by increasing the
maximum amount of the deduction from 15% to 20% of adjusted gross
income. 30
In 1954, Congress renumbered the charitable contribution deduc-
tion provisions to the current § 170. Congress also increased the per-
missible maximum deduction that could be claimed by individual
24. Revenue Act of 1938, [1939] 1 Stand. Fed. Tax Serv. (CCH) 328.
25. Comm. Reports on 1938 Bill, [1939] 1 Stand. Fed. Tax Serv. (CCH) 328, at
1889-90.
26. See, e.g., Mann v. Comm'r, 35 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1929) (holding that the tax-
payer was not entitled to a deduction for accrued charitable pledges because the
taxpayer was a cash basis taxpayer, and it was unlikely the taxpayer would have
been able to claim the deduction even as an accrual basis taxpayer); Appeal of
Musselman, 1 B.T.A. 41 (1924) (holding that an accrual basis taxpayer is able to
deduct charitable contributions during the year that he promised payment rather
than the following year when he actually made the payment).
27. Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, [1944] 1 Stand. Fed. Tax Serv. (CCH) $ 323,
at 2055.
28. Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144 (1934).
29. Id.
30. [1952] 2 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 328, at 6005 (Aug. 13, 1952) (citing "P.L.
465, 82nd Cong. (H.R. 7345)").
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taxpayers from 20% to 30% of adjusted gross income. 3 1 The one ca-
veat for entitlement to the additional 10% was that it had to actually
be paid to the charitable organization rather than "for the use of' the
charitable organization. 32 Hence, payments to a trust for the benefit
of a charitable organization would not qualify for the additional 10%.
More importantly, the additional 10% deduction was allowable only if
the contribution was made to churches or religious orders, educational
institutions, or hospitals. 33 The intention underlying this statutory
amendment was to encourage additional contributions to these orga-
nizations to offset their rising costs and modest returns on endowment
funds. 3 4 This amendment represented the first of several amend-
ments to the various percentage limitations presently included in the
charitable contribution rules. This was also the first time that Con-
gress encouraged certain charitable giving by granting more generous
deductions for donations given to certain charitable organizations
than to others.
In 1958, Congress made several amendments to § 170(b). Under
§ 170(b)(3), the amount of the charitable contribution deduction disal-
lowed because of the provision's limitations on charitable contribution
deductions became deductible in a succeeding year as a net operating
loss carryover under § 172.35 Congress also amended § 170(b) to avoid
double deductions for both interest and charitable contributions. 36
Where a charitable organization had taken property subject to a liabil-
ity or had assumed a liability upon the receipt of the property, 3 7 the
taxpayer's charitable contribution deduction would be reduced by any
interest paid subsequent to the charitable contribution that was at-
tributable to the liability.38
C. Tax Period 1960-1969
In 1960, Congress amended the charitable contribution provisions
to allow a deduction of up to $50 per month for taxpayers who main-
31. H.R. REP. No. 83-1337 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4190.
32. Id.
33. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (1954).
34. H.R. REP. No. 83-1337 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4050.
35. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 11, 72 Stat. 1606, 1609.
While this amendment provided the carryover to corporations only, a later
amendment provided the carryover to individuals. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-272, § 209, 78 Stat. 19, 43.
36. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 12, 72 Stat. 1606, 1610.
37. Where a recipient merely takes the property subject to a liability or mortgage, the
recipient is not personally obligated to repay the liability. If the liability is a
secured obligation, the remedy for the creditor would be foreclosure. Conversely,
where a recipient assumes the liability, the recipient is personally liable and the
creditor can proceed against the recipient by levying on the recipient's assets and
initiating any other viable collection methods.
38. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 12, 72 Stat. 1606, 1610.
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tained an elementary, middle, or high school student as a member of
the taxpayer's household.39 The provision applied where the taxpayer
made maintenance expenditures on behalf of the student in accor-
dance with a program sponsored by the charitable organization and
pursuant to a written agreement with a charitable organization. 40
Under a 1962 amendment, Congress reduced a taxpayer's charitable
contribution deduction by the amount that would have been § 1245
gain 4 ' if the taxpayer had sold the property at its fair market value.42
Further, Congress added "foundations for certain state colleges and
universities" to the list of nonprofit organizations that entitled taxpay-
ers to the additional 10% deduction.4 3
In 1964, Congress made several amendments to § 170 by adding
additional organizations that qualified for the 30% limitation. Con-
gress increased the list of its tax-favored organizations by adding
those that receive a substantial part of their support from a govern-
mental unit or from the general public.44 Congress also enacted an
unlimited charitable contribution deduction for a taxpayer who con-
tributed more than 90% of the taxpayer's taxable income for that taxa-
ble year and for eight of the last ten taxable years. 4 5 The Senate
Finance Committee had introduced a similar bill in 1924, but it was
not enacted at that time.46
The next amendment to the charitable contribution provisions oc-
curred upon the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Congress
enacted many of the current rules dealing with charitable gifts under
this Act. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 was enacted at a time when
members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate be-
lieved that taxpayers with the highest income were not paying their
fair share of taxes.4 7 For example, in 1966, there were 154 taxpayers
whose adjusted gross incomes exceeded $200,000 and twenty-one tax-
payers whose adjusted gross incomes exceeded $1 million who did not
pay any income tax.48 Members of Congress felt that many of these
taxpayers were engaging in certain transactions solely to reduce their
39. Charitable Contribution Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-779, § 7, 74 Stat.
998, 1002.
40. Id.
41. Generally, under § 1245 of the Code, where a taxpayer disposes of certain depre-
ciable property, gain that is attributable to depreciation must be recharacterized
as ordinary income. See I.R.C. § 1245(a)(1).
42. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 13(d), 76 Stat. 960, 1034.
43. Charitable Contribution Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-858, § 2, 76 Stat.
1134, 1134.
44. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 209, 78 Stat. 19, 43.
45. [1964] 2 Fed. Taxes (Prentice-Hall, Inc.) 12,034, at 12,038 (Jan. 1, 1964).
46. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
47. H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1653.
48. Id.
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taxes rather than to further economic objectives.49 Higher income
taxpayers used itemized deductions as a primary catalyst to reduce
their tax liabilities. 50 As a result, Congress took steps to reduce the
perceived tax abuse. Congress phased out the unlimited charitable
contribution deduction by slowly lowering it, by 1974, to a maximum
deduction of 50% of a taxpayer's adjusted gross income. 5 1 Conse-
quently, the unlimited charitable contribution survived for a mere five
years. Congress, also in 1969, raised the previous ceiling on deduc-
tions from 30% to 50% of the contribution base52 and broadened the
applicable contributions to include "operating foundations."5 3 In addi-
tion, the Act also dealt heavily with the contribution of appreciated
property. The 1969 Act reformed the charitable contribution rules by
enacting new provisions that were intended to reduce the benefit tax-
payers received when donating appreciated property. Under the Act,
where a taxpayer had made a contribution of appreciated property to
public charities, the deduction was limited to 30% of the contribution
base.5 4 If a taxpayer elected to limit the charitable contribution de-
duction to the adjusted basis of the contributed property, the maxi-
mum deduction was limited to 50% rather than to 30% of the
contribution base. 5 5 Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, much of the
taxpayer abuse occurred where the taxpayer contributed appreciated
property and claimed a deduction. 56 If a taxpayer elected to claim the
deduction based on the adjusted basis rather than on the fair market
value, the perceived tax abuse would be greatly reduced.
Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969, a taxpayer's charitable contri-
bution deduction must be reduced by the amount of short-term capital
gain or ordinary income the taxpayer would have had to recognize had
the taxpayer sold the property at its fair market value rather than
49. Id. at 1655.
50. Id. at 1653. During taxable year 1966, itemized deductions totaled $130 million
and 116% of the adjusted gross income. Id.
51. 1 A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 74 (Miriam I.R.
Eolis & Joseph S. Robinson eds., 1970) [hereinafter PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE].
52. The contribution base is defined as the taxpayer's adjusted gross income less any
net operating loss carryback. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(f) (2002).
53. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a)(1)(B), 83 Stat. 487, 551. The
term "operating foundation" is further defined in § 4 94 2(j)( 3 ) of the Code as "a
private foundation at least 85% of whose income is spent directly for the active
conduct . . .of the purpose . . . for which it was organized." 1 PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE, supra note 51, at 72.
54. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, sec. 201(a)(1)(B), § 170(b)(1)(D), 83
Stat. 487, 551.
55. Id. § 170(e)(1)(A), 83 Stat. at 555.
56. In 1966, almost $79 million of the $130 million in itemized deductions were allo-
cable to the charitable contribution deduction. H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (1969), re-
printed in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1654. Seventy percent of the charitable
contribution deductions arose from contributions of property, and the majority of
that property was untaxed appreciated property. Id.
2003] 1065
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donated the appreciated property to a charitable organization. 5 7 The
provision applied to assets held for six months or less,58 § 306 stock,5 9
and inventory.60 In such a case, the charitable contribution deduction
was limited to the taxpayer's cost basis of the property, unless the tax-
payer elected to recognize gain on the transfer. A primary focus of this
change was to prevent businesses from structuring a deal as a dona-
tion of appreciated property and receiving deductions equal to the fair
market value of the property, rather than claiming a business ex-
pense, which would be deductible at cost.6 1 After the amendment,
there was uniform treatment irrespective of whether the business
made a charitable contribution or claimed a deduction for a business
expense.
The apparent tax evasion that Congress intended to prevent was
illustrated in Bialo v. Commissioner.62 In Bialo, the taxpayer owned
more than 86% of the stock of a closely-held corporation. 63 The corpo-
ration distributed a pro rata dividend of nonvoting preferred stock on
common stock at a time when the corporation had earnings and prof-
its. Within two weeks of the stock receipt, the taxpayer contributed
the stock to a charitable trust. The taxpayer acknowledged that the
preferred stock was issued to enable the taxpayer to make a charitable
contribution without altering the taxpayer's control over the corpora-
tion.6 4 The issuing corporation redeemed the stock fourteen months
after the charitable trust received the stock. The abuse arising from
this transaction was succinctly stated by the court: "[P]etitioner at-
tempted to use Universal's earnings and profits to make a charitable
contribution for which petitioner took a deduction while neither recog-
nizing dividend income nor losing control of the corporation."65 The
accountant who provided the taxpayer with tax advice regarding the
transaction noted the potential tax savings. If the corporation had
made a taxable distribution to the taxpayer of $100,000, the taxpayer
57. 1 PRACTITIONER's GUIDE, supra note 51, at 72.
58. Today, a short-term capital gain arises when the taxpayer disposes of an asset
held for no more than one year rather than six months. I.R.C. § 1222(1) (2002).
59. Section 306 of the Code requires a taxpayer to recognize ordinary rather than
capital gain income on the disposition of stock (other than common stock) that
had been received in a stock distribution from a corporation and hence excluded
from the taxpayer's gross income in accordance with § 305. Section 306 was en-
acted to prevent capital gain treatment of the so-called "preferred stock bailouts,"
defined as a distribution of preferred stock followed by a sale or redemption of the
stock. Bialo v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1132 (1987).
60. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, sec. 201(a)(1)(B), § 170(e)(1)(A), 83
Stat. 487, 555.
61. 1 PRACTITIONER's GUIDE, supra note 51, at 73.
62. 88 T.C. 1132 (1987).
63. Id. at 1139.
64. Id. at 1135.
65. Id. at 1138 n.6.
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would have had after-tax income of $35,000 based on his marginal tax
bracket.66 However, by distributing the preferred stock instead, the
taxpayer would not have had a realization event upon the distribution
but would have received a charitable contribution deduction of
$100,000 upon his contribution of the stock to his charitable trust.67
In another case, the Tax Court concluded that even absent the egre-
gious evidence of tax avoidance, the tax avoidance could be inferred
from the objective facts.68 In that case, the taxpayer argued that the
stock was not § 306 stock because the disposition of the preferred
stock was not pursuant to a plan with a principal purpose of avoiding
federal income taxes; however, the Tax Court rejected petitioner's
argument. 69
The 1969 Act also addressed contributions of appreciated property
where the taxpayer would have recognized long-term capital gain if
the property had been sold at its fair market value. Under the Act, a
taxpayer's charitable contribution deduction was reduced by 50%70 of
the appreciation that would have been long-term capital gain if the
property had been sold at its fair market value.71 The reduction ap-
plied to gifts of tangible personal property to a donee or governmental
unit if the item donated was unrelated to the purpose or function of
the recipient. 72 For example, the reduction would not apply to a work
of art donated to a university and used in the art department for
course study, but the reduction would apply if the art work was dis-
played in a dean's office. 73 In addition, the reduction applied to contri-
butions to a private nonoperating foundation74 unless the foundation
distributed the property within two and one-half months after the
close of the year in which the contribution was made. The 1969 Tax
Reform Act introduced a basis allocation rule for bargain sales to char-
66. Id. at 1141.
67. Id.
68. Pescosolido v. Comm'r, 91 T.C. 52, 60 (1988).
69. The court concluded that the exception applied to dispositions of § 306 stock by
minority shareholders only, or where there is a prior or simultaneous disposition
of the common stock with respect to which the preferred stock was issued. Id. at
58.
70. The percentage is 62.5% if the contribution involves corporate donors. 1 PRACTI-
TIONER'S GUIDE, supra note 51, at 73.
71. 1 id.
72. 1 id.
73. 1 id.
74. Treasury Regulations define "non-operating foundations" in the following
manner:
If a foundation fails to satisfy the income test and either the assets, en-
dowment, or support test for a particular taxable year under either the
[three-out-of-four-year] method or the aggregation method, it shall be
treated as a nonoperating foundation for such taxable year and for all
subsequent taxable years until it satisfies the tests set forth.
Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(b)-3 (2002).
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itable organizations.7 5 The Act required taxpayers to allocate basis to
both the sale portion and donated portion of the property. The per-
centage of basis allocation was determined by computing the ratio of
the basis and fair market value. A corresponding portion of basis was
allocated to the sale, and the taxpayer was required to recognize capi-
tal gain from the bargain sale. Of course, the taxpayer was still enti-
tled to a deduction for the gift portion of the property transferred to
the charitable organization.
D. Tax Period 1970-1988
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 brought about changes in corporate
charitable contributions of inventory and deductions for expenses in-
curred in order to help influence legislation. Corporations, other than
subchapter S corporations, could deduct up to one-half of the apprecia-
tion plus the taxpayer's basis on certain types of ordinary income
property contributed. 76 Congress denied deductions for individuals
incurring expenses on behalf of charitable organizations to influence
legislation. The purpose of this amendment was to ensure that en-
forcement of lobbying expenses could be done just by examining the
books and records of the organization. 77 The Revenue Act of 1978 re-
pealed the once unlimited charitable deduction that had already been
reduced to 50% in 1969.
During 1981, Congress amended the Code to permit a taxpayer
who did not itemize deductions to claim the charitable contribution
deduction. The amendment was effective for contributions made dur-
ing taxable years 1982 through 1986.78 Consequently, many low- and
middle-income taxpayers were able to claim the deduction. Congress
enacted the amendment to "stimulate [] charitable giving, thereby
providing more funds for worthwhile nonprofit organizations, many of
which provide services that otherwise might have to be provided by
the Federal Government." 79 During the period that taxpayers were
not required to itemize deductions in order to claim the charitable con-
tribution deduction, they were only permitted to claim a certain per-
centage of an allowable dollar cap as herein shown:
75. 1 PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE, supra note 51, at 76.
76. Comm. Reports on Pub. L. No. 94-455 (Tax Reform Act of 1976), [2002] 4 Stand.
Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 11,600, at 25,865-25,866.
77. Id.
78. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-215, at 201-02 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N.
285, 291-92 (reporting on Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981).
79. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND TAX ACT OF 1981, at 49 (Joint Comm. Print 1981).
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Taxable Year Percentage Dollar Cap
1982 and 1983 25% $100
1984 25% $300
1985 50% none
1986 100% none8o
A minor amendment to the charitable contribution provisions was
enacted under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
when Congress added amateur athletic organizations to the list of or-
ganizations warranting charitable contribution deductions. Congress
made more significant amendments to § 170 under the Deficit Reduc-
tion Act of 1984. Under that Act, Congress required substantiation of
the claimed value of donated property that exceeded $2,000 and im-
posed penalties for overvaluation of such donated property.8 1 Fur-
ther, the Act provided for the extension of the five-year carryover
deduction for individuals to include contributions to private nonoper-
ating foundations, and Congress increased the 20% ceiling on such
contributions to 30% for contributions of cash or ordinary income
property.8 2
In 1986, Congress declined to make permanent the temporary pro-
vision that made the charitable contribution deduction an above-the-
line deduction. Consequently, taxpayers could only claim the expense
upon itemizing their deductions. The Revenue Act of 1987 simply
clarified Congress's stance on organizations involved in political activ-
ities8 3 by imposing a statutory disqualification for such organizations,
even if they partly "qualified as a tax exempt charitable
organization."8 4
The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 resulted in
two changes to § 170. Under the first change, if a taxpayer made a
charitable contribution to a college or university and received the
right to either directly or indirectly purchase athletic tickets, the tax-
payer would only be able to claim a deduction of 80% of the contribu-
tion.8 5 Under the second change, Congress required less strict
substantiation requirements for corporate donations of inventory to be
used for care of the ill, the needy, or infants.8 6
80. Id. at 50; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-215, at 201-02 (1981), reprinted in 1981
U.S.C.C.A.N. 285, 291-92 (reporting on Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981).
81. Comm. Reports on Pub. L. No. 98-369 (Deficit Reduction Act of 1984), [2002] 4
Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 11,600, at 25,859.
82. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 301(a)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 777.
83. Organizations involved in political activities are defined as those that participate
or intervene in any political campaign of a candidate who is running for public
office. Comm. Reports on Pub. L. No. 100-203 (Revenue Act of 1987), 12002] 4
Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 11,600, at 25,857-25,858.
84. Id.
85. Comm. Reports on Pub. L. No. 100-647 (Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue
Act of 1988), [2002] 4 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 11,600, at 25,857.
86. Id.
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E. Tax Period 1993-1998
In 1993, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act,
which contained two provisions for § 170. First, § 170 was amended to
disallow any deduction for a contribution of $250 or more unless the
taxpayer has written substantiation from the donee organization.8 7
This amendment significantly decreased the amount previously set as
the substantiation requirement, which had been $2,000 under the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.88 The second provision required the do-
nee charitable organization to inform, by written statement, any do-
nor of a contribution over $75 made partly as a contribution and
partly in consideration of goods and services that the amount allowa-
ble for deduction is the excess of the contribution less the amount of
goods and services received.8 9
In 1996, Congress introduced a small amendment to § 170 in the
Small Business Job Protection Act. The amendment allowed contribu-
tions of qualified appreciated stock to be made to private foundations
in compliance with § 170(e)(5). 90 This amendment was effective only
from July 1, 1996 through May 31, 1997.91 The Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997 expanded the qualified contribution list to include gifts of com-
puter technology and equipment donated either to any educational or-
ganization or to a § 501(c)(3) entity organized for the primary purpose
of supporting elementary and secondary education. 9 2 One of the final
amendments of this Act extended the effective date of the allowance
for contributions of stock to private foundations until June 30, 1998.
However, this extension would become permanent with the passage of
the Tax and Trade Relief Extension Act of 1998.93
F. Summary of Major Changes
It is undisputable that the charitable contribution rules have en-
countered many modifications since their early enactment in 1917. To
recapitulate some of the most important aspects of the current chari-
table contribution deduction rules, the Code limits the maximum de-
duction for individual donors to 50% of the contribution base, which is
defined as the adjusted gross income less any net carryover loss for
87. Comm. Reports on Pub. L. No. 103-66 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993), [2002] 4 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 11,600, at 25,855.
88. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
89. Comm. Reports on Pub. L. No. 103-66 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993), [2002] 4 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 11,600, at 25,856.
90. Comm. Reports on Pub. L. No. 104-188 (Small Business Job Protection Act of
1996), [2002] 4 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 11,600, at 25,855.
91. Id.
92. Comm. Reports on Pub. L. No. 105-34 (Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997), [2002] 4
Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 11,600, at 25,854.
93. Comm. Reports on Pub. L. No. 105-277 (Tax and Trade Relief Extension Act of
1998), [2002] 4 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 11,600, at 25,854.
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gifts to charitable organizations such as churches, educational organi-
zations, health care organizations, and private foundations. 94 Con-
gress enacted the 50% ceiling under the Tax Reform Act of 1969. If a
taxpayer makes a charitable contribution to other types of charitable
organizations, such as nonoperating foundations, the maximum de-
duction is 30% of the contribution base.9 5 Congress enacted this
amendment under the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. Where a tax-
payer makes a contribution of appreciated property to public charities,
the deduction is limited to 30% of the contribution base.9 6 However,
charitable contributions to all other charitable organizations made in
the form of appreciated property is limited to 20% of the contribution
base. 97 If the taxpayer contributed property that would have pro-
duced ordinary income, the deduction must be reduced.98 If a tax-
payer elects to limit the charitable contribution deduction to the
adjusted basis of the contributed property, the maximum deduction is
limited to 50% of the contribution base. Finally, to the extent that a
taxpayer's charitable contribution deduction is limited, it is carried
forward for up to five years.
III. EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS
A. In General
There are several interrelated equity issues that arise in the chari-
table contribution setting. The first logical question is whether chari-
table organizations add any societal value. If so, the issue arises as to
whether the objectives of charitable organizations should be subsi-
dized under the Code. The second equity consideration relates to the
complexity of the charitable contribution rules and addresses schol-
arly proposals to simplify the charitable contribution rules by elimi-
nating percentage limitations. A third issue is whether the charitable
contribution rules should be amended to add an additional incentive
for taxpayers to make contributions to organizations that are designed
to combat poverty. The final issue pertains to the current inability of
lower-income taxpayers to receive tax subsidies for their charitable
giving and the impact of the current charitable contribution deduction
on the progressive tax structure.
94. The list of eligible organizations is found in § 170(b)(1)(A) of the Code.
95. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(B) (2002).
96. Id. § 170(b)(1)(C).
97. Id. § 170(b)(1)(D).
98. Id. § 170(e)(1).
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B. The Tangible Value and Promotion of Charitable
Organizations
1. The Tangible Value of Charitable Organizations
Congress enacted the charitable contribution provisions to en-
courage charitable giving. Charitable organizations provide meaning-
ful resources to the community. The societal value of charitable
organizations cannot seriously be challenged by anyone. For example,
in 1996, it was estimated that 8.4 million people worldwide were in-
fected with AIDS and an additional 21.8 million people had HIV.99
Medical advances have fortunately prolonged the lives of people af-
fected with full-blown AIDS and HIV. The byproduct of such pro-
longed life spans is the increased need for long-term care and
residential facilities. The Bailey-Holt House, a residential facility in
New York City for people infected with AIDS, reported that the aver-
age stay was two years, while approximately ten years earlier the av-
erage stay was less than one year.OO Another organization, God's
Love We Deliver, prepares and provides hot meals to homebound
AIDS patients.iO1 Both of these charitable organizations establish the
value of charitable organizations that provide basic necessities to indi-
viduals inflicted with this debilitating disease. There are countless
other charitable organizations that support other worthwhile objec-
tives. In addition, charitable organizations provide widespread indi-
rect benefits that supplement the actual missions of charitable
organizations. Charitable organizations also strengthen the economy
by employing 8% of the national workforce.102 In 1997, charitable or-
ganizations provided $277.1 billion in salaries, other compensation,
and employee benefits.103 Hence, charitable organizations have a con-
siderable impact on the economy by employing such a large segment of
the population.
2. Subsidizing Charitable Organizations Through Tax
Incentives Versus Direct Expenditures
The use of tax subsidies is only one way to promote charitable orga-
nizations. Alternatively, the state or federal government could subsi-
dize charitable organizations solely through direct expenditures. Thejustification for the government's grant of tax incentives for charitable
organizations and charitable contributions is as follows:
99. GIVING USA 1998, supra note 3, at 96.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Felicity Barringer, Moving Beyond the Four Horsemen of Philanthropy Beat, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2000, at F8.
103. Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 8, at 49.
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The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and
other purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated
for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would other-
wise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.
1 0 4
During taxable year 1999, the amount of charitable deductions
claimed on all returns totaled approximately $270 billion.105 The gov-
ernment subsidized a percentage of that figure based on the taxpay-
ers' marginal tax rates. Assuming, for example, that all taxpayers
were in the 39.6% bracket, the actual government subsidy would have
been $107 billion. Based on the rationale for the charitable contribu-
tion tax subsidy, the government's loss in tax revenue is offset by
avoiding the direct expenditure the government would have made to
promote the general welfare absent the tax subsidy.
Arguably, direct expenditures provide a more efficient manner of
funding charitable organizations than do tax subsidies. However,
problems can surface when Congress directly allocates funds to relig-
ious organizations because of the constitutional requirement of sepa-
ration of church and State.10 6 Federal funds may be used to benefit
religious-based organizations if the funding falls within the province
of the charitable choice provisions of the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.107 Under this Act, re-
ligious-based organizations are authorized to participate in federally
funded social programs in the same manner as any other nongovern-
mental provider, provided the programs are constitutional under the
Establishment Clause.OS The Act expressly prohibits the use of fed-
eral funds for any sectarian worship, instruction, or
proselytization.10 9
104. ROBERT W. WILLAN, INCOME TAXES, CONCISE HISTORY AND PRIMER 31 (1994).
105. Internal Revenue Serv., STAT. INCOME BULL., Spring 2001, at 274.
106. Under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig-
ion." The Establishment Clause prevents the government from affiliating itself
with a religious organization, promoting religious doctrine and organizations,
and intervening in religious affairs. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Mc-
Callum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950, 966 (W.D. Wis. 2002).
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a (2002). But see Carmen M. Guerricagoita, Innovation Does
Not Cure Constitutional Violation: Charitable Choice and the Establishment
Clause, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L & POL'Y 447 (2001) (analyzing the charitable
choice rules and concluding that they violate the Establishment Clause). In Free-
dom From Religion Foundation, Inc., the district court considered whether the
charitable choice statute was unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause
but concluded that the case did not actually involve a challenge to the statute.
179 F. Supp. 2d at 982.
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 604a(a) & (c) (2002). The Act permits the states to either contract
with the religious-based organizations or to accept certificates, vouchers, and
other disbursement methods.
109. Id. § 604a(j).
107320031
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
In determining whether a charitable program violates the Estab-
lishment Clause, the landmark United States Supreme Court opinion
of Lemon v. Kurtzman110 articulated the standard that courts tradi-
tionally applied. In Lemon, the Supreme Court held that the Estab-
lishment Clause was not violated where a program had a secular
purpose, the program's primary effect neither advanced nor inhibited
religion, and the program did not create excessive entanglement be-
tween government and religion."l' The Establishment Clause was vi-
olated where any one of the tests was answered affirmatively. In
addressing the second prong, the Supreme Court in Agostini v. Fel-
ton112 modified the traditional approach by considering whether un-
restricted cash payments were made directly to religious-based
organizations, which would result in a violation of the Establishment
Clause.113 Specifically, the courts have applied the following stan-
dards in determining whether government involvement is impermissi-
ble under the Establishment Clause:
States may not make unrestricted cash payments directly to religious institu-
tions .... In contrast, when public funding flows to faith-based organizations
solely as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of individu-
als, the funding is considered indirect. When a program receives indirect
funding, it is the individual participant, and not the state, who chooses to sup-
port the religious organization, reducing the likelihood that the public funding
has the primary effect of advancing religion in violation of the establishment
clause. A plurality of the Supreme Court has held that as long as the individ-
ual selects the publicly funded program freely, thus making the funding truly
indirect, it is irrelevant whether the funding passes through the hands of the
individual first or goes directly to the selected program. 1 14
The federal courts have decided several cases involving whether
the Establishment Clause was violated as a result of the funding of a
religious-based program. In Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.
v. McCallum,115 the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Wisconsin recently considered whether state funds provided
for religious-based residential treatment for drug and alcohol addicts
and faith-based counseling violated the Establishment Clause.116
Faith Works, the caregiver, received its funding from four sources, but
only funding from Department of Corrections contracts and Depart-
ment of Workforce Development grants raised constitutional concerns.
Under a contract with the Department of Corrections, Faith Works
operated a halfway house for long-term treatment and received reim-
110. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
111. Id., cited in Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
112. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
113. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d at 970.
114. Id. (citations omitted).
115. 179 F. Supp. 2d 950 (W.D. Wis. 2002).
116. Id. at 953.
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bursements when offenders enrolled in the program.1 17 One of the
main components of the Faith Works program was that offenders had
to be willing to "develop their faith and the spiritual aspects of their
lives."lls The offenders were not obligated to accept treatment at
Faith Works and could enroll in some other facility. However, in Mil-
waukee, the largest city in Wisconsin, Faith Works was the only long-
term residential treatment facility. 119 If an offender objected to par-
ticipating in the Faith Works programs, the offender would have been
placed in a halfway house that was not faith-based. Faith Works also
received grants totaling $150,000 for fiscal year 1998 and $450,000 for
fiscal year 1999 from the Department of Workforce Development for
its faith-based, long-term residential care program that addressed
spiritual, emotional, and economic stability. 120 The funds were not
disbursed on the basis of the number of individuals participating in
the program, but rather were disbursed in a predetermined amount.
With respect to the Department of Workforce Development fund-
ing, the court granted summary judgment against Faith Works be-
cause the funding was based on a predetermined amount without
regard to the number of participants who actually enrolled in the pro-
gram.12 1 Consequently, the court concluded that it represented im-
permissible direct funding. With respect to the Department of
Corrections funding, the court denied the motion for summary judg-
ment because the facts did not establish that the offender made "a
genuinely independent, private choice to attend Faith Works."12 2 At
the subsequent trial on the merits, the court concluded that the pro-
gram did not violate the Establishment Clause, notwithstanding that
the participants could participate in the Faith Works program only if
they consented to the religious content. 12 3 The government's involve-
ment was considered to be indirect because the court found that the
offenders made a genuinely independent and private choice to partici-
pate in the program.
In another case, Johnson v. Economic Development Corp., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered
whether the use of tax-exempt bonds to finance the construction of a
Catholic elementary and secondary school violated the Establishment
117. Id. at 960.
118. Id. at 962.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 963.
121. Id. at 954.
122. Id. at 971.
123. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 214 F. Supp. 2d 905 (W.D. Wis.
2002). While the counselors recommended a particular program, the offender
had to consent to the program, and the counselors had to document the consent.
10752003]
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Clause.124 The plaintiff, a resident and taxpayer of Oakland County,
alleged that the Economic Development Corporation violated the Es-
tablishment Clause when it issued tax-exempt bonds125 to the Roman
Catholic school. One of the arguments that the plaintiff raised was
that there had never been a Supreme Court case holding that the Es-
tablishment Clause permitted the use of public funds to reimburse ex-
penditures made by religious schools or to provide direct financial aid
to these schools.126 In rejecting the plaintiffs argument, the court
cited a Supreme Court case that upheld a New York statute allowing
the state to reimburse religious and secular nonpublic schools for the
cost of performing state-mandated tests.12 7 The Sixth Circuit also
recognized the Supreme Court's refusal to adopt a categorical ap-
proach prohibiting all direct government aid.128
While direct expenditures include loan and interest subsidies, the
Sixth Circuit in Johnson refused to accept the plaintiffs argument
that the tax-exempt revenue bonds were equivalent to cash subsidies
within the meaning of the Establishment Clause.129 The court distin-
guished subsidies from tax exemptions. The most significant differ-
ence between the two was that a tax exemption did not require the
government to transfer part of its revenue.130 Finally, the court ap-
plied the Lemon test, as modified by the Supreme Court in Agostini,
and concluded that the tax-exempt revenue bonds did not violate the
Establishment Clause.
One area that remains controversial is the use of school vouchers
or tuition aid for children who attend religious private schools. The
Supreme Court recently considered the constitutionality of the Ohio
voucher program.131 By a narrow 5-4 margin, the Court overruled the
Sixth Circuit's determination that the Ohio voucher program violated
the Establishment Clause.132 Under the Ohio voucher program, the
124. 241 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2001). The Michigan Legislature enacted the Economic
Development Corporation Act in 1974 to "alleviate and prevent conditions of un-
employment." Id. at 503. The Legislature believed that providing assistance to
local enterprises for renovation, construction, and remodeling would lower the
unemployment rate.
125. The tax-exempt bonds carried lower interest rates than conventional loans.
126. Id. at 511.
127. Id. (citing Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646
(1980)).
128. Id. The court cited a Supreme Court case for the proposition that "[i]t is ... well
established.., that not every law that confers an indirect, remote, or incidental
benefit upon religious institutions is, for that reason alone, constitutionally inva-
lid." Id. at 510 (citing Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 770 (1973)).
129. 241 F.3d at 511-12.
130. Id. (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970)).
131. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
132. Id. at 2465. This Article does not attempt to address the myriad of constitutional
issues that arise when public funds are used for religious-based schools. For de-
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participating schools were authorized to use the program's monies for
whatever purpose they deemed appropriate. Most of the schools that
participated in the program were sectarian, 13 3 and most of these
schools included religious teachings in their classes. The primary is-
sue that the Court addressed was whether the program was unconsti-
tutional because it advanced or inhibited religion.13 4 Because the
program benefits were available to participants on "neutral terms,"
without placing a premium or enhanced benefits for families selecting
religious schools,13 5 the Court concluded that the program did not of-
fend the Establishment Clause. 13 6
Conversely, a circuit court judge in Florida ruled that that state's
school voucher program was unconstitutiondl.137 According to the
court, the Florida Constitution 38 clearly and unambiguously prohib-
tailed discussion of these issues, see Nina J. Crimm, Core Societal Values Deserve
Federal Aid: Schools, Tax Credits, and the Establishment Clause, 34 GA. L. REV.
1 (1999); Steven K. Green, The Legal Argument Against Private School Choice, 62
U. CIN. L. REV. 37 (1993); Roy Whitehead, Jr. & Walter Block, Direct Payments of
State Scholarship Funds to Church-Related Colleges Offend the Constitution and
Title VI, 14 BYU J. PUB. L. 191 (2000); R. Craig Wood & Michael C. Petko, Assess-
ing Agostini v. Felton in Light of Lemon v. Kurtzman: The Coming of Age in the
Debate Between Religious Affiliated Schools and State Aid, 2000 BYU EDUC. &
L.J. 1; Kimberly M. DeShano, Note, Educational Vouchers and the Religion
Clauses Under Agostini: Resurrection, Insurrection and a New Direction, 49 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 747 (1999); Scott A. Fenton, Comment, School Voucher Programs:
An Idea Whose Time Has Arrived, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 645 (1997).
133. For the 1999-2000 school year, 96% of the students enrolled in sectarian schools
and 82% of the schools participating in the program were sectarian. Zelman, 122
S. Ct. at 2464.
134. Id. at 2465.
135. Interestingly, the Court found that the Ohio program actually provided financial
"disincentives" for selecting religious schools because the participating public
schools received more governmental assistance, and the families that partici-
pated were required to make a co-pay if their children attended either a religious
or nonsectarian private school. Id. at 2468.
136. Id. at 2467-68. According to the Sixth Circluit, the Ohio program was ineffective
to guarantee that the public funds would be used "exclusively for secular, neutral,
and nonideological purposes." Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 953 (6th
Cir. 2000) (citing Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyguist, 413 U.S. 756, 780 (1973)).
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that, although the statute appeared facially neutral,
the effect was not neutral because the Ohio voucher program discouraged partici-
pation of schools that were nonreligious, and parents could only select schools
that participated in the program. Id. at 959. In addition, the religious schools
had lower tuition because they had lower overhead costs and received monies
from private donations. Because of the lower costs, they were more attractive to
lower-income families. As a result, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Ohio
voucher program failed the second prong of the Lemon test.
137. See Dana Canedy, Florida Court Bars Use of Vouchers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2002,
at A10.
138. Article 1, section 3 of the Florida Constitution provides: "No revenue of the state
or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public
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ited the use of public money to benefit sectarian institutions.139 While
the recent Supreme Court decision in Zelman gave solace to school
voucher proponents by holding that the Ohio voucher program did not
violate the Federal Constitution, the Florida ruling indicated that con-
stitutional hurdles remain a concern under religion clauses in state
constitutions. 140
In light of the constitutional hurdles that are associated with di-
rect expenditures to religious-based charitable organizations, it is not
viable to use direct expenditures to fund these charitable organiza-
tions. These hurdles are reduced where Congress uses tax incentives
instead of direct expenditures. Concededly, the use of the charitable
contribution deduction tax incentive clearly adds complexity to the
Code. Some scholars believe that tax incentives overly complicate the
Code and that Congress therefore should make use of direct expendi-
tures to subsidize nontax objectives.141 However, the use of tax incen-
tives allows the government to indirectly subsidize charitable
organizations, including religious-based organizations, without violat-
ing the Establishment Clause. Obviously, the government is entitled
to provide direct funding to nonreligious charitable organizations;
however, a large percentage of charitable contributions are made to
religious-based charitable organizations. For example, in 1997, 47%
of all charitable contributions were made to religious organizations. 14 2
While the government did not subsidize all of these contributions be-
cause not every taxpayer was eligible to claim the deduction, the gov-
ernment encountered no constitutional prohibitions that would have
existed under improperly structured direct expenditure programs.
This Article does not conclude that the government should alto-
gether refrain from using direct expenditures to subsidize charitable
organizations. Rather, in light of the constitutional constraints, direct
expenditures should not be relied on as the sole method of governmen-
tal subsidization of charitable organizations. They should be used in
conjunction with the charitable contribution deduction tax incentive.
treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomina-
tion or in aid of any sectarian institution."
139. Canedy, supra note 137.
140. According to Robert H. Chanin, general counsel of the National Education Associ-
ation, thirty-six other states have religion clauses in their constitutions similar to
Florida's clause. Lyle Denniston, Judge Says School Vouchers Violate Florida's
Constitution, Says Law Restricts Transfer of Funds, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 6, 2002,
at A2.
141. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 6, at 350; Stanley Surrey, Federal Income Tax Re-
form: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct
Expenditure Assistance, 84 HARv. L. REV. 352 (1970) (contending that the task of
tax reform is that of replacing tax expenditures with direct expenditure
programs).
142. See GIVING USA 1998, supra note 3, at 23.
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When used concurrently, direct expenditures and tax incentives are
an effective means of promoting charitable organizations.
C. Historical Reasons for the Complexity
Many American taxpayers are frustrated with the current length
and density of the Code. In fact, the former Treasury Secretary, Paul
O'Neill, believes that the 9,500 pages of the Code is an "abomina-
tion."143 Tax incentives, such as the charitable contribution deduc-
tion, contribute to the complexity. The charitable contribution rules
have grown substantially since their modest enactment in 1917, from
one short paragraph to seven statutory pages and 108 pages of Trea-
sury Regulations.144 The progression from the original modest enact-
ment in 1917 to the current complicated scheme has already been
outlined in this Article. While many changes were modest, the total-
ity of constant modification during the past seventy years has, in fact,
culminated in the complexity of the rules in existence today. How-
ever, this complexity is an essential byproduct of the charitable contri-
bution deduction, and any simplification is an idealistic impossibility.
Congress created much of this complexity under the Tax Reform
Act of 1969 in order to prevent tax abuse. While the empirical data
showed the abusive effect of itemized deductions, not everyone be-
lieved that the percentage limitations were appropriate. Shortly after
the enactment of the 1969 legislation, members of the Committee of
Tax Policy, New York State Bar Association Tax Section, wrote the
following:
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 added new restrictions to many provisions re-
formers thought inequitable or subject to abuse (such as private foundations,
charitable contributions, the alternative capital gain tax) making each more
complicated than it was before. In some of these instances, the scheme de-
vised by Congress was an overreaction to a limited problem (such as the pri-
vate foundations provisions). The taxpayers affected by these provisions are
now put in a position of having to contend with greater complexity in order to
reap reduced advantages .... 145
To reduce the complexity, the Committee recommended that Con-
gress should enact tax laws that are "more generalized" with "broad
tax objectives rather than detailed rules."146 Some scholars have also
143. See John 0. Fox, Many Unhappy Returns, They're Cutting Taxes. What They
Ought to Do Is Cut the Code, WASH. POST, May 27, 2001, at B02. Specifically,
former Secretary O'Neill stated, "the code today encompasses 9,500 pages of very
small print. While every word ... has some justification, in its entirety it is an
abomination." Id.
144. Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 402.
145. Roberts et al., supra note 6, at 346-47.
146. Id. at 348-49; see also James W. Colliton, Standards, Rules and the Decline of the
Courts in the Law of Taxation, 99 DICK. L. REV. 265 (1995) (stating that the tax
laws have become more complex because Congress has replaced the broad stan-
dards with statutory rules that require longer and more complex statutes).
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proposed additional simplification of the Code by eliminating the per-
centage limitations on charitable contribution deductions. For exam-
ple, C. Eugene Steuerle and Martin A. Sullivan stated the following in
addressing the 30% limitation: "The provision add[ed] an inordinate
amount of complexity to the tax law and probably discourage [d] giving
as much by this complexity and its 'signaling' effect as by any real
economic effect on donors."14 7
In actuality, the detailed rules are necessary to achieve the funda-
mental tax policy of fairness and to curtail tax abuse. Tax abuse goes
hand in hand with more general charitable contribution rules. Also,
there is an inverse relationship between the general rules and tax
fairness. If the detailed rules were repealed, tax abuse and unfairness
would ensue. There is ample support for this proposition by consider-
ing the history of the statutory provisions. A large component of the
complexity is the percentage limitations contained in § 170. The per-
centage limitations were enacted at a time when both the Senate and
House of Representatives found that the tax scheme in place at that
time was unfair. In 1966, there were 154 taxpayers, each with an ad-
justed gross income of over $200,000, who did not pay any income
tax.148 Twenty-one of those 154 taxpayers had adjusted gross incomes
that exceeded $1 million.149 According to the legislative history of the
1969 Tax Reform Act, the use of itemized deductions had allowed tax-
payers in high brackets to avoid taxes.150 In taxable year 1966, item-
ized deductions totaled $130 million, and the itemized deductions
were 116% of the adjusted gross income.151 The charitable contribu-
tion deduction totaled almost $79 million.152 Hence, the charitable
contribution deduction accounted for a large percentage of the total
$130 million of itemized deductions. Seventy percent of the $79 mil-
lion figure was attributed to taxpayers contributing property to chari-
table organizations, and a majority of that property had appreciated
in value prior to the taxpayers' contribution.1 53 Concededly, the per-
centage limitations add complexity to the charitable contribution de-
duction rules. However, the purpose of the percentage limitations
should not be minimized. Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Con-
gress enacted many complex charitable contribution rules to reduce
the amount of the charitable contribution deduction. The legislative
history indicates that the restrictions were imposed because of the
147. Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 417.
148. H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1653.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1654.
153. Id.
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abusive nature of itemized deductions, including those for charitable
contributions. 154
The need for complexity to maintain the objective of tax fairness is
also established by an examination of the history of the § 170 provi-
sions. According to Internal Revenue Service statistics,155 the num-
ber of returns that included a charitable contribution deduction and
the total amount of the deductions were as follows:
Year Returns Reporting Total Amount of Charitable
Charitable Contribution Contributions Reported
(in thousands of dollars)
1975 24,642,672 $15,393,331
1980 26,601,428 $25,809,608
1985 36,162,178 $47,962,848
1990 29,230,265 $57,242,757
1994 29,848,727 $70,544,542
1995 30,540,637 $74,991,519
1996 31,591,983 $86,159,305
1997 32,612,634 $99,191,962
1998 33,835,992 $109,240,078
The intention of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was to simplify the
Internal Revenue Code. 156 Congress eliminated many deductions and
severely limited the deductibility of several expenditures. While sim-
plification of the Internal Revenue Code was a valid congressional ob-
jective, it created an inequity because nonitemizers were unable to
claim the charitable contribution deduction.157 During the period in
which nonitemizers were eligible to claim the charitable contribution
deduction, the number of returns that included the deduction in-
creased by approximately ten million. When Congress decided
against making permanent the temporary provision that enabled
nonitemizers to claim the deduction, the number of taxpayers claim-
ing the deduction was reduced by approximately seven million. Sig-
nificantly, the Internal Revenue Service's statistics illustrate that,
since the 1986 amendment, fewer individuals are claiming the deduc-
154. See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
155. Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 8, at 206.
156. S. REP. No. 99-313, at 3 (1986) (stating general purpose of the Tax Reform Bill of
1986 (H.R. 3838)).
157. In a treatise on charitable giving, Professor Bruce R. Hopkins states:
Makers of tax policy frequently tout, often in a political setting, objec-
tives such as "fairness" and "simplicity." But these objectives are often
in conflict. Frequently, "fairness" can only be achieved by means of
"complexity." Complexity stems from having to write tax laws that
make distinctions between taxpayers in varying circumstances, to
achieve equity. The citizens of the United states [sic] live in an intricate,
complex society; it should not be surprising that the U.S. tax laws reflect
this intricacy.
HOPKINS, supra note 20, at 35.
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tion, but the total amounts of the claimed deductions have in-
creased. 158 The inference to be drawn is that wealthy taxpayers are
claiming higher deductions, but lower-income taxpayers are not re-
ceiving government subsidization for their charitable contributions.
D. Impact on Progressive Taxation
This country has maintained a progressive income tax system
since the inception of the historic 1913 Income Tax Act. Progressive
taxation is based on the principle that higher-income taxpayers
should pay a larger percentage of income taxes. The underlying pre-
mise of progressive taxation is that income taxation should be based
on an ability-to-pay principle, and higher-income taxpayers have a
greater ability to pay taxes. While the progressive income tax system
remains controversial, every attempt to dismantle it in favor of a flat
tax or consumption-type tax has been unsuccessful. 159
The current statutory rules of charitable giving are inconsistent
with this traditional progressive tax structure. 1 60 Under the current
charitable contribution provisions, the progressive tax system is
weakened in two ways. First, the denial of the charitable contribution
deduction to taxpayers who are unable to itemize deductions weakens
the progressive tax system by allowing only higher-income taxpayers
to claim the deduction. Because only itemizers may claim the charita-
ble contribution deduction, the only contributions that the govern-
ment subsidizes are those made by itemizers. 161 Secondly, the
current scheme creates the so-called "upside-down" subsidy. The "up-
side-down" subsidy means that low-income taxpayers will receive
158. Internal Revenue Serv., STAT. INCOME BULL., Fall 1998, at 248.
159. For example, in 1995, Senators Sam Nunn and Pete Domenici proposed the "USA
Tax Act of 1995." See S. 722, 104th Cong. (1995). The Senators proposed the
enactment of a consumption-type tax. The Act would have allowed for tax defer-
ral on income that the taxpayer saved, but it would have also allowed for a deduc-
tion for charitable contributions. Id. § 101(b)(4). In addition, Representative
Dick Armey introduced the "Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1995,"
which also proposed the enactment of a consumption-type tax. See H.R. 2060,
104th Cong. (1995). Unlike the proposal presented by Senators Nunn and
Domenici, the Armey bill proposed a flat 20% tax (17% after 1997) on wages,
retirement distributions, and unemployment compensation, less the standard de-
duction. Id. § 63(a). The Armey proposal did not tax accretions to wealth in the
form of interest and dividends. See also H.R. 3097, 105th Cong. (1998) (proposing
that the current Code be eliminated and replaced with a low tax rate for all tax-
payers); S. 488, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing a 20% flat tax but allowing for a
charitable contribution deduction not to exceed $2,500).
160. See Bullock, supra note 9, at 341 ("[r]efusing a deduction entirely to [middle- and
low-income individuals] breaches a basic tenet of the progressive rate structure").
161. The recently enacted Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
exasperates this. The Act eliminates the phaseout of itemized deductions for
higher-income taxpayers over a five-year period of time beginning in 2006. See
2001 TAX LEGISLATION, supra note 11, $ 210, at 51.
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lower tax subsidies than high-income taxpayers because of their lower
marginal income tax rates.1 6 2
The legislative history of the predecessor to § 170 indicates that
the purpose of the original charitable contribution deduction was to
allow a wealthy taxpayer to receive a deduction for charitable giv-
ing.16 3 While this may have been justified during 1917 because only
wealthy taxpayers paid taxes, this is not the reality in today's society.
In modern times, many lower- to middle-income taxpayers pay income
taxes but are prevented from claiming a charitable contribution de-
duction. Statistics show that charitable giving by low-income individ-
uals is "generous."16 4 There is evidence suggesting that taxpayers
who claim the standard deduction are responsible for approximately
one-third of all charitable contributions. 6 5 In fact, statistics show
that the lower-income taxpayers actually contribute a greater percent-
age of their income to charitable organizations than do their higher-
income counterparts. 166
According to Internal Revenue Service statistics, 69% of tax re-
turns filed during 1998 claimed the standard deduction.16 7 More than
one-half of the returns claiming the standard deduction had adjusted
gross incomes of less than $20,000.168 The standard deduction is in-
tended in part to subsidize charitable contributions made by
nonitemizers; hence, it is likely that many of the taxpayers whose
gross income is less than $20,000 are receiving a comparable deduc-
162. Many scholars have addressed the "upside-down subsidy" in their scholarship.
See, e.g., Charles T. Clotfelter, What is Charity? Implications for Law and Policy:
Tax Induced Distortions in the Voluntary Sector, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663,
672 (1989) ("[d]istortions in the price of giving arise because different people face
different subsidy rates (and prices) which bear little relationship to any objective
characteristics of the gift"); Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contribu-
tions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1405 (1988) (stating that the use of charita-
ble contribution deductions is troubling because it is cheaper for high-income
taxpayers to make charitable contributions than low-income taxpayers); Thomas
D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J.
343, 361 (1989) (stating that the "upside-down" subsidy could be avoided by mak-
ing rate changes that will ensure that the deduction will be "revenue neutral"
and "distributionally neutral"); Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for
Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L.
REV. 377, 383 (1972) (stating that the charitable contribution deduction provides
the greatest incentive to those who financially need it the least); John K. Mc-
Nulty, Public Policy and Private Charity: A Tax Policy Perspective, 3 VA. TAX
REV. 229, 244 (1984) ("[tlax expenditure budget advocates deprecate the charita-
ble contribution deduction as an 'upside down' subsidy of the kind that Congress
would never enact in the direct expenditure budget").
163. SEIDMAN, supra note 21, at 944-45.
164. Tax Report, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2001, at Al.
165. See GIVING USA 1998, supra note 3.
166. See Bullock, supra note 9, at 341, 343; Davies, supra note 6, at 1771.
167. Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 8, at 213.
168. Id. at 33.
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tion. However, eleven million taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes
of between $40,000 and $75,000 also claimed the standard deduc-
tion.169 An additional 1.3 million taxpayers with adjusted gross in-
comes of between $75,000 and $100,000 claimed the standard
deduction, as well.170 According to Internal Revenue Service statis-
tics, more than one-half of the charitable contribution deductions
claimed during taxable year 1998 were attributable to taxpayers with
adjusted gross incomes of at least $100,000.171 Approximately 76% of
the charitable contribution deductions were attributable to taxpayers
with adjusted gross incomes of at least $60,000.172 Taxpayers with
adjusted gross incomes of $1 million or more made 1.2% more contri-
butions in the form of property compared to contributions of cash.173
It is probable that many of the noncash charitable gifts are in the form
of appreciated property. This raises the fairness issue discussed
above.
The case of Herman v. United States1 74 illustrates how wealthy
taxpayers are able to take advantage of substantial tax savings, which
results in a reduction of their effective income tax rates. During taxa-
ble year 1990, the plaintiffs in Herman donated medical equipment to
a hospital. While the appraised value of the equipment exceeded $1
million, the plaintiffs purchased the equipment from the donee, a hos-
pital, two years prior to the donation for $40,000 after the donee had
filed a petition for bankruptcy. The hospital had planned to sell the
property at an auction and hoped to net $37,000.175 Each plaintiff
claimed a charitable contribution deduction in the amount of
$501,190, but the Internal Revenue Service only allowed a deduction
for each plaintiff in the amount of $20,000. While the district court
acknowledged that the plaintiffs received tax windfalls, it concluded
that they were in fact entitled to use the appraised value for purposes
of determining their charitable contribution deductions. There was no
indication that the plaintiffs acted fraudulently. However, this case
shows how the higher-income taxpayers manipulated the rules by
purchasing property well below the fair market value, donating the
property to a charitable organization, and claiming a deduction in the
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 41.
172. Id.
173. Id. Thirty-seven percent of charitable contributions by taxpayers with adjusted
gross incomes of between $200,000 and $500,000 were noncash contributions,
and 62% of the contributions made by taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of
between $500,000 and $ 1 million were noncash contributions. Id. For all other
taxpayers, the percentage of noncash gifts ranged from 17% to 27%. Id.
174. 73 F. Supp. 2d 912 (1999).
175. The hospital's attorney testified at trial that the $37,000 amount was based on an
appraisal of the equipment's liquidation value. In dicta, the court stated that the
property was grossly undervalued, to the detriment of the hospital's creditors.
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amount of the fair market value. At the same time, nonitemizing tax-
payers are denied the opportunity to claim even a modest deduction.
E. The Use (or Lack Thereof) of Charitable Contributions to
Reduce Poverty
1. Empirical Data Outlining Trends in Charitable Giving
The breakdown of charitable giving for 1997176 was as follows:
Type of Charitable Amount of Contribution Percentage of Total
Organization (in billions of dollars) Charitable Giving
Religion $74.97 47.0%
Education $21.51 13.5%
Foundations $11.20 7.0%
Health $14.03 8.8%
Human Services $12.66 7.9%
Public/Society Benefit $8.38 5.3%
Arts $10.62 6.7%
Other $6.05 3.8%
There are two categories of charitable organizations that reduce the
effects of poverty: human services organizations and public/society
benefit organizations. Human services organizations include crime
prevention, youth services, sports, housing, disaster relief, nutrition,
and vocational training.177 Public/society benefit organizations in-
clude community improvement and development corporations that are
instrumental in the revitalization of neighborhoods.178 According to
the empirical data, charitable giving during 1997 totaled approxi-
mately $159.42 billion, but donors contributed only $21 billion to
human services organizations and public/society benefit organiza-
tions. Consequently, it would appear that a large percentage of the
charitable contributions made during 1997 were not made to organiza-
tions designed to alleviate poverty. However, while this category in-
cludes poverty-relief organizations like the Salvation Army, it covers
many other charitable organizations that have other objectives. More-
over, some studies show that most human services organizations do
not focus on the needs of low-income individuals, and only a small por-
tion of human services organizations attempt to alleviate poverty by
providing food, clothing, or other basic necessities.' 7 9 The empirical
data from 1997 is similar to charitable giving in other years. For ex-
ample, in 1999, the total amount of charitable contributions was
176. GIVING USA 1998, supra note 3, at 23.
177. Id. at 40.
178. Id. at 42.
179. See Bullock, supra note 9, at 346-47.
2003] 1085
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
$190.16 billion.180 The majority of this charitable giving was made to
religious organizations, and the second highest amount was made to
educational institutions.1 81
Charitable giving to organizations benefiting the neediest sector of
the population is relatively modest.182 In 1999, of the top twenty-five
organizations receiving the highest charitable donations, only three
are to be considered poverty-relief organizations.1 8 3 For 1999, of the
top twenty-five organizations receiving the highest donations, six
were educational institutions.184 The top recipients were Harvard
University, Cornell University, Duke University, Stanford University,
Columbia University, and the University of Pennsylvania.1 8 5 Obvi-
ously, these universities are among the most elite in the country, and
no one could seriously contend that the charitable contributions to
them result in widespread benefit to low-income individuals. These
statistics are consistent with those of charitable bequests by dece-
dents. In 1995, decedents made approximately one-third of charitable
bequests to educational, medical, or scientific organizations, but they
made no more than 1% of charitable contributions to organizations
designed to improve the social welfare and plight of the needy.18 6
This is consistent with the data establishing that donors support char-
itable organizations that provide them with either direct or indirect
benefits. 187
2. Enacting Legislation to Encourage Charitable Giving to
Poverty-Relief Nonprofit Organizations
a. In General
In view of the fact that individuals are contributing a nominal
amount to organizations designed to provide assistance to lower-in-
come individuals, Congress has made proposals to spur charitable giv-
ing to those organizations. The current rules already provide varied
180. JUST GIVE, DONOR INFO, at http://www.justgive.org.html/doninfo/billions.html
(last visited Oct. 3, 2001) (available in the University of Nebraska Law College
library). Seventy-five percent of that amount is derived from individuals. Id.
181. Id.
182. Peter Kilborn, Charitable For Poor Lags Behind Need, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1999,
at Al.
183. NETSCAPE, CHARITIES RECEIVING HIGHEST DONATIONS IN 1999, at http:l!
webcenter.netscape.inforplease.com/ipaA0770757.html (last visited Apr. 11,
2001) (available in the University of Nebraska Law College library). The Salva-
tion Army received the most donations, America's Second Harvest received the
eighth-most donations, and Habitat for Humanity International received the
ninth-most donations. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Internal Revenue Serv., STAT. INCOME BULL., Summer 1999, at 81-82.
187. See Bullock, supra note 9, at 343.
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percentage limitations based in part on the classification of the chari-
table organizations. Under the current charitable contribution provi-
sions, the amount of the deduction is generally limited to either 50%
or 30% of one's adjusted gross income, depending on the type of chari-
table organization receiving the contribution. For instance, charitable
contributions made to churches, educational institutions, hospitals,
museums, and anti-poverty organizations are treated consistently
under the Code and subject the donor to the 50% limitation. Charita-
ble contributions made to organizations such as private foundations
subject the donor to the 30% limitation. Scholars have addressed
whether disparate treatment for certain charitable giving is appropri-
ate.18 8 In addition, members of Congress have proposed legislation
that is designed to encourage charitable giving to organizations that
serve the needs of the poor. There is a congressional proposal pending
that is intended to spur charitable giving to organizations that serve
the needs of the poor. Representative James T. Kolbe of Arizona intro-
duced a proposal on February 14, 2001 that would amend the Code to
provide a nonrefundable credit of up to $100 for single taxpayers and
$200 for taxpayers who file a joint return for charitable giving to orga-
nizations that combat poverty.1 8 9 The charitable organization receiv-
ing the contribution must provide services to individuals whose
incomes do not exceed 150% of the poverty threshold.190
The tax laws should not be amended to grant more favorable treat-
ment to organizations designed to alleviate poverty. If Congress
wants to provide a source of increased funding to nonprofit organiza-
tions that combat poverty, the most appropriate and practical manner
would be in the form of direct expenditures. While Congress would be
unable to appropriate funds directly to religious-based charitable or-
ganizations because it would run afoul of constitutional barriers al-
ready discussed in this Article, it could make direct expenditures to
other types of charitable organizations whose goals are to reduce the
effects of poverty. For example, Habitat for Humanity makes afforda-
ble home ownership available to low-income individuals by contribut-
ing supplies and by using volunteers to help build the homes.19 1 Any
contribution of cash or supplies is already deductible under the Code.
If Congress would like additional funds to support the efforts of
Habitat for Humanity, it should allocate grant monies to the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development to avoid the technical diffi-
culties of using the Code to provide the additional incentive.
188. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 162.
189. See H.R. 673, 107th Cong. § 25B (2001). A taxpayer is entitled to elect to take the
charitable contribution deduction in lieu of the nonrefundable credit. Id.
§ 25B(f).
190. Id. § 25B(d)(2).
191. GivING USA 1998, supra note 3, at 51.
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Theoretically, the proposal to amend the tax laws to encourage ad-
ditional charitable giving to organizations that combat poverty repre-
sents sound congressional tax policy. However, in practice, the
proposal is wrought with technical difficulties, three of which will be
discussed. First, there are substantial administrative problems with
defining just which nonprofit organizations would be eligible for the
comparatively favorable tax treatment. Second, there are other types
of charitable organizations that provide societal value equal to or in
excess of that provided by those nonprofit organizations that work to
eradicate poverty. Finally, if Congress were to amend the rules to pro-
vide more favorable treatment to these types of organizations, it
would inevitably lead to a multitude of other special interests lobbying
Congress to enact provisions favorable to their causes as well.
b. Administrative Constraints
The proposed legislation includes a reasonable description of what
types of charitable organizations would entitle the donor to enhanced
tax incentives. The charitable organization must provide assistance
to individuals whose incomes do not exceed 150% of the poverty
threshold. In addition, at least 70% of the charities' reasonably ex-
pected annual expenditures must be on behalf of an exempt pur-
pose. 192 This proposal is almost identical to a proposal that had been
introduced in 1995 and criticized by Professor Alice Gresham Bul-
lock.193 Professor Bullock explained that the standard for determin-
ing how an organization used the funds was insufficient. 19 4 She also
stated that taxpayers would have to keep additional records, and the
Internal Revenue Service would have increased costs. 19 5 Finally, the
proposal would increase the administrative burden of the charitable
organizations. 19 6 The proposal that Representative Kolbe introduced
in 2001 did not address these administrative shortcomings. Hence,
while there were some benefits that could be derived from the enact-
ment of the proposal, the administrative constraints outweighed those
benefits.
c. The Comparable Value of Other Nonprofit Organizations
The value of charitable organizations that attempt to alleviate pov-
erty is substantial. Hence, the value of these organizations must not
be diminished. However, is the objective to eradicate the effects of
192. See H.R. 673, 107th Cong. § 25B(d)(3)(A) (2001). No more than 30% of the ex-
penditures can be made for administrative expenses, lobbying, fundraising, and
litigation. Id.
193. See Bullock, supra note 9.
194. Id. at 358.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 359.
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poverty more worthwhile than causes promoted by other types of char-
itable organizations? For example, charitable giving to nonprofit
healthcare organizations is, at a minimum, as valuable and arguably
more valuable than charitable giving to organizations that combat
poverty. The charitable organizations classified as healthcare organi-
zations are diverse and include organizations devoted to research and
service organizations that focus either on general health issues or spe-
cific diseases.197 Presumably, this category would include organiza-
tions such as the American Cancer Society, which has consistently
waged campaigns that are designed to discourage cigarette smoking.
The probable justification for these campaigns is to reduce the harsh
effects of smoking, such as lung cancer and heart disease. Other
health organizations engage in research to find cures for debilitating
or fatal diseases such as Parkinson's disease, AIDS, cancer, and
Alzheimer's disease. The charitable contribution deduction provisions
already distinguish among recipient charitable organizations by pro-
viding higher percentage limitations for gifts to certain charitable or-
ganizations, including nonprofit health organizations and those that
combat poverty. Consequently, no additional incentive should be en-
acted by Congress to further encourage charitable contributions to or-
ganizations combating poverty.
d. The "ABC Syndrome"
During taxable year 1997, the Internal Revenue Service recognized
580,416 active nonprofit charitable organizations as § 501(c)(3) tax-ex-
empt organizations.198 The total amount of contributions, gifts, and
grants for these organizations during 1997 totaled $146.2 billion.199 If
Congress passed an amendment to the charitable contribution rules to
enhance the incentives for charitable giving to combat poverty, it
would lead to a multitude of other special interests lobbying Congress
to enact provisions favorable to their causes as well. Members of Con-
gress have already introduced bills that would amend the charitable
contribution deduction rules to provide an additional incentive for
charitable giving in other areas. 20 0 This phenomenon has been coined
as the "ABC Syndrome."201 The impact of the "ABC Syndrome" is in-
creased statutory complexity. Congress should avoid creating addi-
197. GIVING USA 1998, supra note 3, at 93.
198. Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 8, at 47.
199. Id. at 48.
200. See, e.g., H.R. 744, 107th Cong. (2001) (encouraging charitable giving for medical
research); S. 462, 107th Cong. (2001) (promoting education by granting a credit
for contributions to organizations providing scholarships to students attending
elementary and secondary schools).
201. See Vada Waters Lindsey, The Widening Gap under the Internal Revenue Code:
The Need for Renewed Progressivity, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2001).
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tional complexity into an already necessarily complex statutory
provision.
IV. PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE OF
CHARITABLE GIVING
A. The Effect of the Estate Tax Repeal
Under the current estate and gift tax provisions, a tax is imposed
on devises, bequests, and inter vivos gifts. 20 2 A donor is entitled to an
unlimited deduction for charitable bequests 2O3 and gifts to charitable
organizations. 20 4 In the past, decedents have made sizeable gifts to
charities in the form of charitable bequests. For estate tax returns
filed during 1995-1997, the Internal Revenue Service estimates that
decedents claimed the following charitable deductions: 20 5
Year Charitable Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of
Contribution Returns all Deductions Gross Estate
Deduction Including
Deduction
1995 $9.7 billion 18.3% 16.2% 7.1%
1996 $10.2 billion 17.9% 16.9% 7.8%
1997 $14.3 billion 17.3% 19.4% 8.8%
In 2001, President George W. Bush signed into law a massive
$1.35 trillion tax cut. The law included a phaseout of the estate tax.
Under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001, the estate tax will be completely phased out for taxpayers dying
after 2009.206 For decedents dying after 2001 and prior to 2010, es-
tate tax liability has been reduced as a result of adjustments to the
unified credit and the estate tax rates. 20 7 The new rates and credits
are as follows:
202. See I.R.C. §§ 2001(a), 2501(a) (2002).
203. See id. § 2055(a).
204. See id. § 2522(a).
205. Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 186, at 80, 96, 99, 102, 105.
206. There is a possibility that the repeal will be temporary because the Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 is scheduled to expire at the
end of 2010. Therefore, unless future legislation is enacted reinstating the tax
cut enacted in 2001, the repeal of the estate tax will be short-lived.
207. For purposes of the gift tax, the amended tax rates are applicable, but the appli-
cable exemption applies only to the estate tax. After the complete phaseout of the
estate tax, the maximum gift tax rate will be 35%. See 2001 TAX LEGISLATION,
supra note 11, 308, at 105.
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Year Exemption Amount Tax Rate
2002 $1,000,000 50%
2003 $1,000,000 49%
2004 $1,500,000 48%
2005 $1,500,000 47%
2006 $2,000,000 46%
2007 $2,000,000 45%
2008 $2,000,000 45%
2009 $3,500,000 45%
Generally, prior to the enactment of the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act, where a taxpayer devised property, the re-
cipient received a "stepped-up" basis equal to the fair market value of
the property at the decedent's death or on the alternate valuation
date. 20 8 To offset any possible tax abuse resulting from the tax-free
income tax consequences and the estate tax relief, Congress elimi-
nated the so-called stepped-up basis of § 1014. Under the 2001 Act, a
donee of property generally receives a carryover basis. However, Con-
gress only partially repealed the generous stepped-up basis rules.
Under the new rules, the basis of estate property can be increased by
up to $1,300,000.209 Any basis increase cannot exceed the fair market
value of the property. 2 10 In addition, for estate property that passes
to a surviving spouse, an additional $3 million basis step-up is permit-
ted. 211 While the amendment to the stepped-up basis rules offsets
some of the inevitable double tax benefits resulting from the repeal of
the estate tax, there remain significant tax benefits to retaining prop-
erty until death and devising it under a testator's will.
When considering the repeal of the estate tax and the maximum
step-up of $4.3 million, there exist negligible incentives to contribute
money or appreciated property to a charitable organization. Hence, it
is probable that the phaseout of the estate tax will have a negative
impact on charitable bequests.2 12 While donors make charitable be-
quests for a variety of reasons, effective estate planning for the
wealthy would result in their making large charitable bequests to re-
duce estate tax liability. In 1997, decedents claimed $14.3 billion in
charitable contribution deductions, which represented 8.8% of the de-
208. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (2001).
209. 2001 TAx LEGISLATION, supra note 11, 9 332, at 118.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Death Without Taxes?, 20
VA. TAX REV. 499 (2001) (stating that while it is impossible to predict the extent
of the increased costs of charitable giving, repeal of the estate tax might alter the
allocation of charitable bequests and hurt charitable organizations that are more
sensitive to tax changes); see also James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes and
Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825 (2001) (outlining reasons why the federal transfer
tax is appropriate).
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cedents' gross estates.213 In order for the government to continue pro-
moting charitable giving under the Code, it might be necessary for
Congress to bolster the charitable contribution tax incentive. This is
particularly true if the repeal of the estate tax becomes permanent
after 2010. Congress's initial attempt to make the repeal permanent
failed, 214 but it is likely that there will be continuous efforts to either
weaken or permanently eliminate the estate tax.2 15 There is legisla-
tion pending that would eliminate the sunset provision of the 2001
Act. 2 16 If the legislation is enacted, all tax cuts enacted under the
2001 Act will be permanently extended, including a permanent repeal
of the estate tax.
B. Reformation of the Charitable Contribution Rules
Some members of Congress have recognized the need to subsidize
nonitemizers' charitable contributions. During 2001, the House of
Representatives passed a proposal that would allow nonitemizers to
take an annual deduction of up to $25 for charitable contributions
made during taxable years 2002 and 2003.217 The maximum deduc-
tion would be increased to $100 beginning in taxable year 2010.218
For taxpayers filing joint tax returns, the maximum deductible
amount would be $50 during taxable years 2002 and 2003 and $200
beginning in taxable year 2010.219 While the enactment of the statu-
tory proposal would have reduced some inequity, it failed to suffi-
ciently redress much of the disparate treatment between taxpayers
who itemize their tax returns and those who claim the standard de-
duction. In any event, Congress has not taken any action to enact this
proposal.
Alternately, Congress has considered the enactment of a credit to
supplement the current income tax charitable contribution rules. For
example, on February 7, 2001, Representative Dan Burton introduced
the "Charitable Giving Act of 2001" that would have allowed taxpay-
ers to claim a credit of up to $200 for cash contributions in lieu of the
213. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
214. The vote on the repeal was 54-44, and the Senate needed sixty favorable votes for
the measure to pass. See Shailagh Murray, Permanent Repeal of Estate Tax is
Put Down by Vote in Senate, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2002, at Al.
215. See John D. McKinnon & Lynn Asinof, Why You Should Rewrite Your Will: Es-
tate-Tax Repeal is Dead, but Families Must Still Adjust Plans; Protecting the
Spouse, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2002, at Dl.
216. See H.R. 2327, 107th Cong. (2001).
217. Tom Herman, Tax Report: A Special Summary and Forecast of Federal and State
Tax Developments, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2001, at Al.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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current charitable contribution deduction. 220 The enactment of the
$200 credit would not supplant the current charitable contribution de-
duction. Rather, it would supplement the current deduction and allow
all taxpayers to receive a credit of up to $200 for cash contributions.
Taxpayers would be able to claim a deduction for cash contributions in
excess of $200 and contributions of property. The credit would take
precedence over the deduction, and the taxpayer would have to make
an affirmative election to make the credit inapplicable. The bill was
referred to the House Ways and Means Committee, but no additional
action was taken on the proposal. In view of the phaseout of the estate
tax, it is important to adjust the charitable contribution rules to pro-
vide more incentive for charitable giving. The enactment of a
nonrefundable credit creates an additional incentive for charitable
giving because tax credits result in more tax savings than tax
deductions. 221
One significant drawback of the enactment of a credit in conjunc-
tion with the current deduction is that itemizing taxpayers, usually
higher-income taxpayers, will be entitled to claim both a deduction
and credit whereas the nonitemizing, lower-income taxpayers will
only be able to claim the modest credit. Moreover, based on the
nonrefundability feature of the proposed credit, the taxpayers will not
be able to receive any tax benefit if they do not have a tax liability
during the taxable year. A tension does exist between countering the
impact of the estate tax repeal on charitable giving and protecting the
integrity of progressive taxation. Although it may not be possible to
satisfy both objectives concurrently because of the inherent conflict, it
is possible to structure any future amendments to the charitable con-
tribution rules in a manner that diminishes the tension.
The enactment of a $200 credit in conjunction with the current
charitable contribution deduction would lessen the impact of the up-
side-down subsidy by providing nonitemizers with governmental sub-
sidization of their charitable contributions. However, additional
modifications should be made to the proposed bill to further
strengthen the tax incentive. First, the credit should be allowed for
contributions of property in addition to cash contributions. As the es-
tate tax is phased out, there is less of an incentive to make charitable
bequests of appreciated property. If Congress made gifts of appreci-
ated property eligible for the proposed credit, it would provide imme-
220. H.R. 494, 107th Cong. § 30B (2001). Several scholars have analyzed the viability
and impact of transforming the charitable contribution deduction to a tax credit.
See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and
Covert, 66 TENN. L. REV. 687 (1999); Bullock, supra note 9.
221. A deduction merely reduces a taxpayer's taxable income, while a tax credit repre-
sents a dollar-for-dollar reduction in actual tax liability. The one limitation with
a nonrefundable credit is that it provides no tax benefit if the taxpayer does not
have any tax liability during the taxable year.
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diate tax savings and partially offset the disincentive of decedents
making charitable bequests as a result of the estate tax repeal. Under
basic time value of money principles, an immediate tax deduction or
credit is more favorable than future tax benefits. Second, to
strengthen the tax incentive, the maximum credit should be increased
to $400 for single taxpayers and $800 for married taxpayers filing
joint returns. Third, the amount of the credit should be reduced by a
percentage of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. As the adjusted
gross income increases, the amount of the allowable credit should de-
crease. The justification for the reduction is to protect the integrity of
the progressive tax system. The reduction also works to assure that
the credit is not too costly for the government. Congress must weigh
the impact of any newly enacted tax incentive against the cost of the
tax incentive measured by reference to the loss of tax revenue. Hence,
the modification to the proposed bill minimizes the cost of the charita-
ble contribution credit and addresses the problem of how the govern-
ment can continue encouraging charitable giving without weakening
the progressive tax system.
Congress has relied on varied percentages in determining the
amounts of credits under other tax provisions. Many of these other
credits are associated with purported socially desirable activities, such
as encouraging adoption and higher education. The maximum credit
for the child and dependent care expenses is 35% of the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income. 22 2 As the adjusted gross income increases, the
credit is reduced to a minimum credit of 20% of allowable expenses. 2 23
The child tax credit begins to phase out for single taxpayers when ad-
justed gross income reaches $75,000 and for married taxpayers filing
joint returns when adjusted gross income reaches $110,000.224 Con-
gress promotes adoption by granting a nonrefundable credit for ex-
penses related to adoption. 22 5 The credit begins to phase out where
the taxpayer's adjusted gross income reaches $150,000.226
Congress also promotes education in several ways under the Code.
A taxpayer is entitled to a credit for eligible educational expenses, but
the credit is also phased out if the taxpayer's adjusted gross income
exceeds $50,000 for single taxpayers and $100,000 for taxpayers filing
joint returns.2 27 Similarly, in order to provide an additional incentive
for charitable giving, Congress should enact a credit to supplement
the current charitable contribution deduction. It is within Congress's
222. I.R.C. § 21(a)(2) (2002). The 35% figure applies for taxable years after December
31, 2002. Prior to that time, the figure was 30%.
223. Id. For taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of at least $43,000, the credit is
20% of the allowable expenses.
224. Id. § 24(b).
225. See id. § 23.
226. Id. § 23(b).
227. Id. § 25A(d)(2).
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discretion to determine the proper percentages and phase-out
amounts after a consideration of factors, including the proposed
credit's impact on revenue and the probable effect that the phaseout of
the estate tax will have on charitable contributions.
Finally, a taxpayer should be able to carry forward for a five year
period the amount of the credit that has been reduced by the applica-
ble percentage. The charitable contribution provisions already allow
for the carrying forward of charitable contribution deductions that are
disallowed by the percentage limitations. As applied to the credit, as-
suming that a single taxpayer makes a charitable contribution of
$1,000, the taxpayer would be able to claim a maximum credit of $400.
If, for example, Congress enacted a 20% credit for this taxpayer's in-
come level, the credit for the current taxable year would equal $80,
and the balance of the $400 would be carried forward for five years.
The taxpayer's credit for the subsequent years would be allowed to the
extent that it did not exceed the 20% maximum credit. Consequently,
if the taxpayer made an additional $1,000 charitable contribution, the
taxpayer would not be able to claim any of that amount as a charitable
contribution credit. That additional charitable contribution would be
reported as a deduction under the general provisions of § 170.
V. CONCLUSION
The charitable contribution deduction remains an integral part of
the Code. However, in its present form, the tax incentive does not
benefit all taxpayers. In 1998, only approximately 27% of all income
tax returns reported charitable contribution deductions. 2 28 Conse-
quently, the charitable contribution deduction is ineffective in creat-
ing a bona fide income tax incentive for the majority of taxpayers. Its
present form is inconsistent with our established progressive tax sys-
tem. Congress should implement reforms to the charitable contribu-
tion rules. These reforms are essential to encourage charitable giving,
which will likely be undermined by virtue of changes to the estate and
gift tax provisions. The estate tax provisions contain unlimited chari-
table contribution deductions, but it is likely that there will be a re-
duction in charitable giving in the future because of the phaseout of
estate taxation. While the income tax and estate and gift tax provi-
sions are distinct statutory acts, charitable contributions are inter-
twined in both acts.
To remedy the problems associated with the charitable contribu-
tion rules, Congress should make several adjustments to § 170 in or-
der to strengthen the tax incentive. The recommended adjustments
provide an additional incentive for charitable giving but promote the
fundamentals of the progressive tax system. Some scholars might
228. Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 8, at 205-06.
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opine that it is inappropriate for the government to encourage low-
and low-to-middle-income taxpayers to contribute funds to charitable
organizations because these taxpayers should use their available
funds to purchase basic necessities of life. That is, the Code should
not encourage these taxpayers to contribute money when they are the
least able to afford such contributions. There is some validity to that
position. However, to the extent that a low- or low-to-middle-income
taxpayer is making charitable contributions, they should receive a
subsidy in the same way as do higher-income taxpayers. By not al-
lowing these taxpayers to claim the tax incentive, only the higher-in-
come taxpayers dictate which charitable organizations will essentially
receive governmental subsidization. Moreover, the allowance of the
credit for low-income taxpayers protects the integrity of the progres-
sive income tax structure. By making the recommended changes,
Congress could maintain the delicate balance between creating a tax
incentive that benefits all taxpayers and ensuring that the tax incen-
tive remains effective as the estate tax is gradually phased out.
The current income tax provisions continue to provide income tax
incentives that encourage charitable giving. However, Congress
should enhance the income tax incentives to offset the probable de-
cline in charitable bequests. Moreover, even if the repeal of the estate
tax is temporary, Congress should enact some form of a charitable
contribution credit to allow nonitemizing taxpayers the opportunity to
receive a tax subsidy for their charitable contributions. In such a case,
the phaseout of the credit should be based on relatively modest ad-
justed gross income levels.
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